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Preliminary Proxy Statement
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Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
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Definitive Proxy Statement
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Definitive Additional Materials
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Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12
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No fee required.
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Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
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Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
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Total fee paid:
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Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.
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Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.
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Amount Previously Paid:
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Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
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“As the incumbent nominees have deep industry experience to draw on, and the incumbent board has won the approval of equity analysts in driving the turnaround to this point, we believe shareholders will be better served by re-electing the management nominees.” (PROXY Governance, Inc.)
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“Based on various improvements in the Company’s performance in recent periods, we find the election of Dissident nominees to the Board to be unwarranted at this time.” The report also states “the Dissident’s plan for improvement contains many overlapping elements with the Company’s own strategic plan” and that “we are not convinced that the changes espoused by the Dissident are necessary at this time.” (Glass, Lewis & Co.)
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At Western Sizzlin, Mr. Dash’s Board tenure coincided with a significant decline in revenue and profit and a 28% decline in units, ranking the company #6 on the dubious list of “America’s Fastest Shrinking Restaurant Chains,” compiled by Forbes.com and RestaurantChains.net (http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Forbes/10-fastest-shrinking-restaurant-chains.aspx?GT1=33002).
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Of particular note, the precipitous decline at Western Sizzlin was accompanied by significantly strained franchisee relations, suggesting Mr. Dash is not well-suited to assist Denny’s, a company with 85% franchised units. In fact, during this current contest, Mr. Dash and his fellow dissidents have directly attacked the Denny’s Franchisee Association (DFA) and made false and unfounded allegations against its Chairman, Craig Barber, actively fostering a climate of dissension among franchisees.
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At Steak n Shake, Mr. Dash worked as an “advisor” to the CEO for 18 months! We fail to see how a year-and-a-half of consulting work constitutes meaningful operational experience. Furthermore, Mr. Dash has failed to indicate exactly what his actual responsibilities included, the specific contribution he made or the particular skills he employed to make that contribution. Additionally, during that period it appears that Steak n Shake was more focused on becoming a holding company (now Biglari Holdings), with numerous non-restaurant related acquisitions, rather than running a restaurant.
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While Risk Metrics/ISS pointed out that there has been increased short-term stockholder value at these two companies, there is no indication whatsoever that any of this increased value stemmed from any sustainable operational improvements. In the case of Western Sizzlin, Mr. Dash and his colleague Sardar Biglari engineered value at an otherwise rapidly-declining chain through its takeover by Steak n Shake (a company which they also controlled); and at Steak n Shake, near-term improvements have been attained through short-term cost cutting and other steps where the long-term implications of these steps are still to be determined.
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Although they profess to want to work with the Board, none of the dissident nominees have ever spoken to the Company or made legitimate efforts to discuss their views or learn about the Company’s strategy and plan. PROXY Governance points out in its report that Mr. Dash had not even invested the time to understand the Company’s marketing strategy and that his recommendation that Denny’s reduce capital expenditures by $10 million was based simply on the fact that it was “the right number for Steak n Shake.”
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Mr. Dash has still not returned the Company’s call since it promptly returned the message he left for one of its Board members, and the Dissident Group has still never responded to the Company’s letter of March 13 offering to speak with the Group.
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The Group has demonstrated a record of saying whatever is required to achieve its goals, and notwithstanding its statements to the contrary, we believe its goal is to ultimately obtain control of the Company without paying a premium to other shareholders because that is exactly what its members have done in the past. Actions speak louder than words:
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WHAT THEY SAID
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WHAT THEY DID
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Steak n Shake
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“[Dissidents] are not seeking control of the Board of Directors at the Annual Meeting”
- Definitive Proxy Filing, 2/11/2008
“the board’s letter reiterates the falsity that we are seeking to control the company for our own personal benefit and therefore should pay a control premium. Nothing could be further from the truth.”
- Addt’l Solicitation material 2/21/2008
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· Only 1 of 9 original directors still on Board 2 years after Biglari nominated
· Biglari assumed Chair, CEO and President roles within 5 months of joining Board; eventually renamed the Company after himself
· Premium paid for control = 0%
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Western Sizzlin
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“[Dissidents are] seeking Board representation. Except as set forth above, the Reporting Persons have no present plans or intentions that would result in…any change in the present board of directors or management of the issue.
- 11/10/2005 13-D
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· 6 of 9 directors resign upon Biglari’s nomination to the Board
· Dash appointed to the Board within a month
· In less than a year, Biglari usurps full control of all investment decisions
· Premium paid for control = 0%
· Company merged with Steak n Shake, now part of Biglari Holdings.
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Denny’s
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“[Dissidents] are not seeking control of Denny’s. In fact, as clearly disclosed in our proxy statement, we are only seeking minority representation on the board.”
- 4/30/2010 Fight Letter
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